What are the rules regarding the supplier committee
Meeting Minutes Chat
What are the rules regarding the supplier committee
hwilhelm@iatf.org · 2026-10-17 04:21 AM EDT
# The Supplier Committee — rules in the IATF AISBL documents
The Supplier Committee is governed at three levels: the **Articles of Association** (which mandate its existence), the **Internal Regulations** adopted as Annex 5 to the First Board Meeting minutes (which contain the detailed rules), and the **competition law / standard-setting compliance guidelines** (which set out why suppliers must be involved and what rights they get in standard setting).
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## 1. Constitutional basis — Articles of Association
From `01foundingdeed__IATF_AISBL_-_Founding_Articles_of_Association_-_EN.txt` (the same text appears in `01foundingdeed__IATF_AISBL_-_Founding_Deed.txt`):
- **Art. 18.1**: "The Association shall at all times have the following committees whose functioning will be regulated by Internal Regulations: … **(c) Supplier Committee, composed of representatives of suppliers to be appointed as specified in the Internal Regulations**". It is therefore a mandatory, permanent committee — unlike other committees, which under Art. 18.2 the General Assembly "may decide to establish or to abolish".
- **Art. 18.3**: Members' ordinary right to appoint representatives does **not** extend to it — "Each Member may appoint a representative, together with an alternate representative, to each Committee **except for the Supplier Committee**, the Complaints Committee and the Remuneration and Finance Committee."
- **Art. 18.4(c)**: Departing from the default (a Board member as chair, a distribution-partner expert as co-chair), "the chairperson and the vice chairperson of the Supplier Committee … **will be elected by the members of the Supplier Committee from among them**."
- **Art. 19.2**: "The interests of the suppliers will be specifically represented through the NAIAs and through the Supplier Committee (Article 18.1(c))."
- **Art. 23.1–23.2**: The General Assembly adopts Internal Regulations for each Committee, and "The Articles of Association will at all times prevail over possible conflicting provisions of the Internal Regulations."
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## 2. Detailed rules — Internal Regulations, Section 11
From `02firstboardmeeting__IATF_AISBL_-_05_Minutes_of_First_Board_Meeting_-_Annex_5_Internal_Regulations.txt`:
**Purpose (11.1)** — "The Supplier Committee provides structured input from the automotive supplier landscape to IATF on topics within IATF's remit to enhance representativeness and practicality of IATF policies and standards. In addition, the Supplier Committee elects representatives who are delegated as members of the Standardisation Committee, where they collaborate on the development of standards based on the resolutions of the Supplier Committee and who report to the Supplier Committee on the work of the Standardisation Committee."
**Size and nature (11.2.1)** — "In deviation from Section 4, the Supplier Committee shall have **up to 30 members who are not members of IATF**, selected to be representative of the automotive supplier landscape".
**Eligibility — "Eligible Members" (11.2.2(a))** — a supplier may only serve if:
- (i) it is **not subject to Sanctions** (UN or authorised-agency economic/trade/financial restrictive measures); and
- (ii) at the latest on acceptance of membership it:
- (aa) is an automotive industry supplier (Tier 1, Tier 2 or Tier 3, as defined in the clause);
- (bb) states compliance with the obligations applicable to Supplier Committee members under the Articles and other by-laws, "in particular any compliance guidelines of IATF";
- (cc) states submission to **separate NDAs to be provided by the Board**;
- (dd) "bindingly commit[s] to secure the **IP created within the scope of standardisation** for the IATF by separate agreements to be provided by the Board";
- (ee) "shall be **IATF certified or ISO 9001 certified**, unless the Board grants dispense … (e.g. in case the prospective member is active in a non-certified supply sector, such as certain software development sectors)";
- and must **maintain those conditions throughout the term of membership**.
**Who nominates — "Elector Associations" (11.2.2(b)(i))** — members are proposed by supplier industry associations from among their members, each with a quota:
| Elector Association | Seats |
|---|---|
| CLEPA (Europe) | up to five |
| MEMA (United States) | up to five |
| JAPIA (Japan) | up to five |
| CAAM (China) | up to five |
| ACMA (India) | up to five |
| KAICA (Korea) | up to five |
If an Elector Association proposes fewer than its quota "within two months following a request from IATF, then the member seats not used shall remain vacant, and the Board may attribute them to any organization that is not a member of an Elector Organisation, that fulfills the criteria of an Eligible Member and that has applied for membership … **in the order of applications received**."
**Diversity duty (11.2.2(b)(ii))** — Elector Associations must ensure "to the greatest extent possible" that nominees "collectively represent a diverse range of the supplier industry, particularly in terms of size, sector, position in the supply chain, geography, and product range", and "are encouraged to not exclusively propose members of the relevant Elector Association."
**Terms (11.2.2(b)(iii))** — renewable three-year terms; the initial members are "divided by lot into three equal groups": Group A five years, Group B four years, Group C three years (staggering).
**Replacement (11.2.3)** — if a member ceases to be an Eligible Member, resigns or is removed for cause, it is replaced for the remainder of the term "by an alternate member appointed by the association that has appointed the departing member."
**Board's role (11.2.4)** — "The Board **shall accept** any member proposed in accordance with the preceding paragraphs, save for cases of lack of Eligible Member quality or if the proposal right of an Elector Organisation has been exhausted", and shall document and organise the process.
**Chair (11.3)** — chairperson and vice chairperson "shall be elected among its members for a **renewable term of two years**. The Supplier Committee may at any time replace a chairperson thus elected. The Board shall provide organisational assistance to the chairperson." Section 5.4 confirms this is a deviation from the default rule that the Board appoints committee chairs from among Board members.
**Seats on the Standardisation Committee (11.4)** — "The chairperson and the vice chairperson of the Supplier Committee **shall be the two representatives serving as members of the Standardisation Committee**" (cross-referenced at 9.1.2).
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## 3. General committee rules that also apply (Internal Regulations, Part I)
Section 2.3 makes Part I applicable "to all Committees … unless otherwise stated herein". So, subject to the Section 11 deviations:
- **3.2** — the General Assembly may issue a written mandate or terms of reference specifying objectives, responsibilities and reporting obligations.
- **6.1** — meet "at least once per calendar quarter"; **6.2** in person, virtual or hybrid.
- **6.3** — quorum: "at least half of the Committee members are represented."
- **6.5–6.6** — resolutions proposed by the chairperson or at least two members; consensus is the aim, otherwise one vote per member and "**a resolution is adopted if at least 75 % of the votes cast by the attending members are in favour, excluding abstentions**."
- **6.4.1** — 14 calendar days' notice (shorter if urgent); **6.7** — written/electronic procedure with a 14-day response period, non-response counting as abstention.
- **6.8–6.10** — minutes requirements; circulated within 7 days, deemed approved absent objection within 14 days.
- **6.11** — recording/transcription/translation only with unanimous consent of those present.
- **7** — the Committee may establish Working Groups by resolution, from among its own members.
- **8** — "The provisions on conflict of interests of members of the Board (Article 14.3 of the Articles of Association) shall apply mutatis mutandis to the members of the Committees."
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## 4. Role in standard setting
- **Internal Regulations 9.3.1(f)** — the Supplier Committee is one of the bodies that may **submit proposals to initiate or revise a standard**.
- **Internal Regulations 9.5.2(c)** — "The chairperson of the Standardisation Committee shall circulate the **Committee Draft to all IATF members and the Supplier Committee for review and feedback**."
- **Compliance guidelines (Guidelines for Standard Setting and the Certification Scheme, cl. 2.6)**, in `complianceguidelines__17_02_26_2.2_Guidelines_Set_2_Draft_8__Clean.txt` (header: "PRIVILEGED and CONFIDENTIAL | Draft 8 of 17 February 2026") and in the executed Annex 4 version at `02firstboardmeeting__IATF_AISBL_-_04_Minutes_of_First_Board_Meeting_-_Annex_4_Competition_Law_Guidelines.txt`: "Suppliers shall participate in the standard setting process via the Suppliers Committee, as foreseen in the Association's Articles of Association. The Suppliers Committee shall be **kept informed continuously** throughout the standardization process, shall be **consulted at major milestones**, shall have an **adequate right of review of proposed changes** and shall have the **right to submit proposals for changes**. It shall have the right to **second two representatives to the Standardization Committee with voting rights**. Details shall be stipulated in the Terms of Reference of the Standardization Committee and the Supplier Committee."
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## 5. Glossary definition (used in the contracts)
In the distribution partner contracts — e.g. `finalforsignature__II.2_260717_Distribution_Partner_Contract_for_IATF_Publications.txt` (item 116), `finalforsignature__II.1_260717_3rd_Party_Auditor_Training_Distribution_Partner_Contract.txt`, `distributionpartnercontracts__260213_Distribution_Partner_Contract_for_the_Management_of_CBs_…_CLEAN.txt` and the pending-contracts annex — the Glossary defines: "**Supplier Committee**: A body of IATF AISBL which provides structured input from the automotive supplier landscape to IATF AISBL on topics within IATF AISBL's remit to enhance representativeness and practicality of policies and standards of IATF AISBL."
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## Points that are open or unresolved on the documents
- **Terms of reference / NDAs / IP agreements**: Internal Regulations 11.2.2(a)(ii)(cc) and (dd) refer to separate NDAs and IP-securing agreements "to be provided by the Board", and the standard-setting guideline cl. 2.6 refers to "Terms of Reference of the Standardization Committee and the Supplier Committee". I did not locate those Supplier-Committee-specific instruments in my searches for "Supplier Committee" and "committee"; on what I have read, they are contemplated but not themselves set out in the documents I reviewed.
- **Two seats vs. "voting rights"**: Internal Regulations 9.1.2/11.4 give the Supplier Committee two seats on the Standardisation Committee held ex officio by its chair and vice chair; the compliance guideline cl. 2.6 describes these as seats "with voting rights". The Internal Regulations do not in terms say that the two delegated representatives vote — Section 6.6's "Each Committee member has one vote" would suggest they do, but I would not resolve that as a matter of interpretation here.
- **Vice chair
who owns the training material
# Who owns the training material
The answer runs along a chain of three instruments. In short: **the five Rights Holders (AIAG, ANFIA, IATF France, SMMT, VDA) own the IP in the Training; IATF AISBL holds an exclusive, irrevocable, sub-licensable licence to it; and Distribution Partners get only a non-exclusive licence to deliver it.** One document departs from that description, and I flag it below.
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## 1. Ownership sits with the Rights Holders — IP Rights Licensing Agreement
`finalforsignature__I.1_260710_Intellectual_Property_Licensing_Agreement_Between_the_Current_Copyright_Holders_and_IATF_AISBL.txt` (parties: IATF AISBL and Rights Holders 1–5 = AIAG, ANFIA, IATF France, SMMT, VDA).
- The Preamble defines the asset: "IATF AISBL undertakes the creation and delivery of trainings and training materials related to the Standards (**'Training'**)."
- Ownership: "**Rights Holders own the intellectual property rights to past, current and future developments, revisions, iterations and versions of the Standards, Works and Training as joint rights holders.**"
- **Clause 1.1**: "Rights Holders are joint owners of intellectual property rights pertaining to the Subject Matter described in this section 1."
- **Clause 1.5** brings the training expressly into the Subject Matter: "Subject Matter of this Agreement are also past, current and future editions, revisions, iterations and versions of the Training", specifically —
- 1.5.1 3rd Party Auditor Training;
- 1.5.2 "ADP Platform Technical Training and assessment materials";
- 1.5.3 "Add-Ons to 3rd Party Auditor Training, meaning any supplementary materials, chapters, courses, modules or features to be included into the 3rd Party Auditor Training developed by Rights Holders and/or Contributors";
- 1.5.4 1st and 2nd Party Auditor Training.
- IATF AISBL's position is **licensee, not owner** — **clause 2.1**: "Each of the Rights Holders herewith grants to IATF AISBL … any and all of their respective physical and non-physical IP Rights … as an **exclusive, irrevocable, transferable and sub-licensable license, unlimited in time, place and content**", including the right to "create, market, sell, improve … develop, translate, rewrite, lend, rent, edit and modify" and "to make derivative works".
- The licence is free: the Preamble records it is "granted on a non-remunerated basis in furtherance of IATF AISBL's non-profit purpose", and **clause 7.1**: "Rights Holders waive the assertion of any claims for remuneration."
- **Clause 3.2** requires IATF AISBL to mark all copies "with a copyright notice that clearly states IATF AISBL is the **exclusive licensee** of the IP Rights **owned by Rights Holders**", and **clause 6.1** requires attribution "clearly stating that Rights Holders own the IP Rights in said subject matter".
- **Clause 2.6** — the licence reverts: "The grant of the exclusive license … shall automatically cease and all exclusive IP Rights shall revert to Rights Holders in the event that IATF AISBL enters into liquidation, or is otherwise dissolved."
- **Clause 4.7** preserves the Rights Holders' right "to make or to let make Contributions to future editions … of the Standards, Works and/or Training".
## 2. Upstream: authors assign to the Rights Holders — IP Transfer Agreement Between Contributors and Rights Holders
Found in `02firstboardmeeting__IATF_AISBL_-_02_Minutes_of_First_Board_Meeting_-_Annex_2a_Final_Contracts.txt` ("IP TRANSFER AGREEMENT BETWEEN CONTRIBUTORS AND RIGHTS HOLDERS"), and described in the contract-overview table at the front of that annex: "To be signed between Rights Holders and each Contributor that makes Contributions to Standards, Works [and Training] … **Contributors transfer IP Rights to Rights Holders. IATF AISBL acts as** [representative]".
- Preamble (D): "Contributor participates in the development of the Standards and/or Rev. 2 and/or the Works and/or **the Training** … Contributor transfers and assigns any and all of its IP Rights that arise during the process of developing Standards and/or Rev. 2 and/or the Works and/or [the Training]".
- Preamble (E) is retrospective: where IP Rights in past Contributions have not yet been transferred, "Contributor hereby undertakes to transfer and assign such IP Rights to Rights Holders."
- **Clause 2.1**: "Contributor herewith **irrevocably transfers and assigns to the Rights Holders** to the broadest extent legally possible any and all of their physical and non-physical IP Rights … in the [Contributions]".
- **Clause 2.2 (fallback)**: where outright transfer is not legally possible (e.g. copyright in civil-law systems), Contributor "grants to Rights Holders, who accept, an exclusive [licence]" to "reproduce, process, exploit, create, market, sell, improve, copy, perform, distribute, develop, translate, rewrite, lend, rent, edit and modify any and all Contributions".
- **Clause 1.2** carves out third-party material: "'Contributions' shall solely comprise creations … that wholly originated by the Contributor or that are in the public domain and shall not include any intellectual property, proprietary information, or other rights owned or controlled by third parties."
The same structure is described in the licensing agreement's Preamble: Rights Holders "conclude agreements with Contributors and/or their employers, whereas IATF AISBL may act as a representative of Rights Holders, so that Rights Holders become the joint owners of IP Rights pertaining to such Contributions which – as part of Standards, Works and/or Training – they further license to IATF AISBL".
## 3. Downstream: Distribution Partners own nothing — 3rd Party Auditor Training DP Contract
`finalforsignature__II.1_260717_3rd_Party_Auditor_Training_Distribution_Partner_Contract.txt` (header: "Draft of 10 June 2026"):
- **Clause 10.1**: "The IATF AISBL grants the Distribution Partner, who accepts, **non-exclusive, world-wide and sublicensable Copyrights solely to Administer and Deliver 3rd Party Auditor Training** as well as to conduct Promotion and Marketing Activities permitted under this Contract."
- **Clause 10.6**: "Unless expressly granted by the IATF AISBL to the Distribution Partner, the right to **amend, adapt, change, translate or otherwise modify** 3rd Party Auditor Training is **expressly and solely reserved by the IATF AISBL**." Clause 13.4 repeats the translation reservation; clause 5.7 says the DP may not "create, revise, or translate 3rd Party Auditor Training" absent a separate contract.
- **Clause 14.2** keeps the fee off the IP: the Training Delivery Fee "remunerates Delivering and Administering services … It is **not consideration for the grant of, or right to use, any IP Rights**."
- **Clause 19**: "Upon Contract Expiration or termination of the Contract, the grant of rights pursuant to sections 5 and 10 shall cease and **all rights granted by the IATF AISBL to the Distribution Partner will revert to the IATF AISBL**." Clause 11.6.6 requires sublicences to Sub-Contractors to terminate and revert at the same time.
- Unauthorised alteration of the Training is good cause for termination (clause 18.3.1, "Material IP Infringement").
- Note clause **8.11**, which does leave room for DP-created content: "In addition to the 3rd Party Auditor Training, the Distribution Partner may offer courses with supplementary materials, chapters, modules or features for purposes of training Auditor Candidates." **The contract does not say who owns those DP-created supplementary materials.** Clause 1.5.3 of the licensing agreement treats "Add-Ons … developed by Rights Holders and/or Contributors" as Rights Holder property, but that is addressed to Rights Holders/Contributors, not to a Distribution Partner acting under clause 8.11. On the documents I read, that gap is not resolved, and I will not resolve it for you.
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## A discrepancy you should be aware of
The 3rd Party Auditor Training DP Contract, **Preamble (B)**, states: "**The IATF AISBL is the exclusive owner of all intellectual property rights (hereinafter: 'IP Rights') pertaining to the 3rd Party Auditor Training.**" (The same wording appears in the pending-contracts version at `02firstboardmeeting__IATF_AISBL_-_03_Minutes_of_First_Board_Meeting_-_Annex_2b_Pending_Contracts.txt`.)
That describes IATF AISBL as **owner**, whereas the IP Rights Licensing Agreement makes it the **exclusive licensee** of rights owned jointly by the five Rights Holders, and clause 3.2 of that agreement positively requires copyright notices to say so. The two are not easy to reconcile on their face. It may be shorthand aimed at the DP (who in either case takes only a licence from IATF AISBL), but the corpus does not contain anything that reconciles them, and I am not able to tell you which was intended — nor what earlier drafts said, since the corpus holds only one version of each document.
## What I could not find
I searched for "Training Material", "ownership of IP/Intellectual Property/materials", "Training … shall be the property/owned", "assign/transfer to IATF AISBL", "exclusive owner of all intellectual property" and "Contributor / Add-On / 1st & 2nd Party Auditor Training Distribution Partner Contract".
- I did **not** locate a separate 1st & 2nd Party Auditor Training Distribution Partner Contract in the corpus. That matters because the Glossary (item 4, in `finalforsignature__II.1…` ANNEX III and the other DP contracts) says the 1&2PDP is "Responsible for **developing**, Delivering and Administering Training for 1st and 2nd Party Auditors" — i.e. a partner that creates material. Clause 1.5.4 of the licensing agreement puts 1st/2nd Party Auditor Training within the Rights Holders' ownership and I
what are the criteria to remove a general assembly member
# Removing a member of the General Assembly — the exclusion rules
The General Assembly "is formed by the Members of the Association" (**Art. 9.1**), so removing someone from it means **excluding a Member**. That is governed by **Article 7** of `01foundingdeed__IATF_AISBL_-_Founding_Articles_of_Association_-_EN.txt` (same text in the French deed `01foundingdeed__IATF_AISBL_-_Founding_Deed.txt`, Art. 7.3). Note **Art. 25**: "The Articles of Association are drafted in French and English, but **only the French version represents the official text**" — I quote the English below.
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## 1. The five substantive grounds — Art. 7.3(a)
"Any Member which either
- **(i)** no longer fulfils the criteria of Membership of its relevant category referred to in Article 5.1 of the Articles of Association (for the avoidance of doubt: the criterion set out in Article 5.1(b) last sentence shall not be taken into consideration for the purposes of loss of Membership);
- **(ii)** is in breach of its Membership obligations under Article 6;
- **(iii)** jeopardizes the interests of the Association;
- **(iv)** is involved in a procedure of dissolution, liquidation, bankruptcy or judicial reorganization or similar procedures in any jurisdiction (unless such procedure exclusively concerns a subsidiary entity of the respective Member); or
- **(v)** has set any other serious cause,
may be excluded as a Member by decision of General Assembly."
Two cross-references give these content:
- **Ground (i) — Art. 5.1 criteria**: for OEMs, being "a parent organization that designs and assembles automobiles and/or on-highway trucks, excluding holding companies unless the holding company itself is an OEM"; for NAIAs, representing the automotive industry's interests in a specific country, having existed at least five years, disposing of committees/working groups and "an established automotive quality related competency". The carve-out means the **OEM:NAIA 2:1 ratio in Art. 5.1(b) last sentence cannot be used as a ground for exclusion** — it is an admission test only.
- **Ground (ii) — Art. 6.1 obligations**: compliance with the Articles, Internal Regulations and decisions; active participation and support; (NAIAs) representativeness of national interests; designating a representative and alternate; compliance with "competition law and trade secret protection … includ[ing] the compliance guidelines established by the General Assembly"; unconditional acceptance of mutual recognition of certificates; and good-faith performance. Art. 6.1 closes with a safeguard: "Members are not required to comply with IATF decisions where complying with such decisions would be **unlawful** for the respective Member."
## 2. The deemed serious cause: persistent non-attendance — Art. 7.3(b)
"If a Member has failed to directly participate through its designated representative or alternate in the General Assembly in **12 consecutive months** and has not participated via delegation to another Member as per Article 9.2 either, such Member's voting right in the General Assembly will be **(automatically and without further notice) suspended** and will only be reinstated (automatically and without further notice) once such Member has participated in **three successive meetings**. Upon suspension of the voting right, the Board shall address a **registered warning letter** … announcing that Membership may be terminated by exclusion if such Member does not resume its participation within **six months**. The fact of not resuming participation in the General Assembly within the said deadline **will be considered to be a serious cause within the meaning of (a)(v)** above."
## 3. Procedure — Art. 7.3(c)–(d)
- **Initiation (c)**: "The exclusion procedure may be initiated upon proposal of the General Assembly or by the Board." The Board's power to "propose the exclusion of Members and execute any exclusion voted by the General Assembly" is confirmed at **Art. 17.2(g)**; exclusion is a reserved General Assembly power under **Art. 10.1(c)**.
- **Notice (d)**: "the Board will inform the Member concerned, **by registered letter**, of the relevant facts, **at least sixty (60) days prior to the proposed date of exclusion**, except for cases of (b) above."
- **Right to cure (d)**: "The Member concerned shall be allowed to **definitively remedy within this period** the consequences of the violation(s) having led to the proposal for exclusion (**if capable of remediation**)."
- **Right to be heard (d)**: the GA may exclude only "if the Member concerned is **invited to the meeting and has been given the opportunity to defend its position** during the meeting … and before the vote."
- **Majority (d)**: "Exclusion will require a vote of **75% of the Members present**, and **Article 12.4 shall not apply**; the Member to be excluded shall **not be entitled to vote**." (Art. 12.4 is the rule that abstentions are disregarded, so here abstentions count against the 75% threshold; and the threshold is expressed against Members *present*, not votes cast.) The ordinary quorum in **Art. 12.1** — at least 75% of all Members with voting rights present or represented — is not displaced.
- **Interim suspension (d)**: "All rights of the Member concerned are **suspended from the time of receipt of the letter** from the Board (cf. (b) and (d) sentence 1) to the Member **until the vote** of the General Assembly on the exclusion."
- **Reasons and finality (d)**: decisions "shall be **motivated** and are **final, binding and without appeal** other than the complaints procedure with the **Complaints Committee**, whose decision will be without appeal or other legal remedy." The Complaints Committee is a mandatory committee (Art. 18.1(g)) and is further regulated at Section 13 of `02firstboardmeeting__IATF_AISBL_-_05_Minutes_of_First_Board_Meeting_-_Annex_5_Internal_Regulations.txt`.
## 4. Consequences — Art. 7.4
The excluded (or resigning) Member must abide by all commitments "until the end of the financial year in which the end of its Membership becomes effective"; has no claim to indemnification, repayment or the Association's assets; "shall immediately cease to present itself as a Member"; must confirm deletion of electronic documents and return printed standards; must **transfer, at no cost and without undue delay, any IP or systems it owns relating to the standards** ("e.g., IATF database, ADP, AMP, IATF globe, IATF trademarks, copyright filings etc."); and may later be "reconsidered as a candidate for Membership".
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## Other things that may be what you meant
- **Loss of membership without exclusion.** Art. 7.2 (resignation on six months' registered-letter notice to the President of the Board) and **Art. 5.2** (corporate restructuring): on a merger "only the continuing entity will remain a Member", the discontinued membership terminating "on 31 December of the year following effectiveness of the merger"; on a split or spin-off, the resulting OEMs "**will cease to be Members**" but have an automatic readmission right if they apply within one year. These operate by their own terms — no exclusion vote.
- **Removing a Member's individual representative.** That is the Member's own decision, not the Association's: Art. 6.1(d) — "a Member may replace its representative or its alternate **with immediate effect at any given time**."
- **Removing a Board member** (a different thing from a GA Member): **Art. 14.4** — "Any Member of the Board may be removed by decision of the General Assembly by a **75% majority of the votes cast**, without applying Article 12.4. If removal is sought **for serious reason** set by the relevant member of the Board, a majority of **50% of the votes cast** will be sufficient", read with Art. 10.1(d) and Art. 12.3(a).
## Points I cannot resolve for you
- **Art. 7.1 is incomplete on its face.** It reads "The status of Member is lost by:" and then simply runs into the 7.2/7.3 headings — the colon introduces no list. The structure implies resignation and exclusion (plus the Art. 5.2 cases), but the text as it stands does not say so, and the corpus holds only this version, so I cannot tell you whether something was intended to follow.
- **The Internal Regulations for Membership do not appear to exist yet.** Arts. 5.6 and 5.7 contemplate them ("that **may** be adopted", "**to be adopted** by the General Assembly"), including the complaints procedure that is the only recourse against an exclusion. My searches for "Internal Regulations for Membership" returned only these forward-references in the Articles — the Internal Regulations in Annex 5 cover the Committees, not membership. So the detailed complaints procedure referred to in Art. 7.3(d) is not in the documents I read.
- **Art. 5.9** requires the Association to have "at least five Members at all times". The Articles do not say what happens if an exclusion would take the Association below that floor, and I will not resolve that interaction here.
National industry association membership criteria
# NAIA membership criteria
National Automotive Industry Associations ("NAIA") are one of the **two categories of Member** of IATF AISBL (the other being OEMs). The criteria are in **Article 5.1(b)** of the Articles of Association — I quote the English text from `01foundingdeed__IATF_AISBL_-_Founding_Articles_of_Association_-_EN.txt`, but note **Art. 25**: "The Articles of Association are drafted in French and English, but **only the French version represents the official text**." The French equivalent is at Art. 5.1(b) of `01foundingdeed__IATF_AISBL_-_Founding_Articles_of_Association_-_FR.txt` (and in the deed itself, `01foundingdeed__IATF_AISBL_-_Founding_Deed.txt`), where NAIA is rendered "**ANIA**" — "associations nationales de l'industrie automobile".
---
## 1. The definitional criterion — what a NAIA is
**Art. 5.1(b)**: "National Automotive Industry Associations ('NAIA'), i.e. **organizations that represent the interests of the automotive industry in a specific country**, which includes – but is not limited to – **representing views, opinions and interests of suppliers of various sizes, commodities and at multiple tier levels of the automotive supply chain** (and, as the case may be, non-Member OEMs) …"
French: "les organisations qui représentent les intérêts de l'industrie automobile dans un pays donné".
## 2. The exclusivity criterion — one per country
"… it being understood that **only one NAIA representing (i) suppliers or (ii) suppliers and OEMs per country can be a Member** …"
French: "étant entendu que, **par pays, ne peut être Membre qu'une seule ANIA** représentant (i) des fournisseurs ou (ii) des fournisseurs et des OEM".
## 3. The three qualification criteria
"… and that an NAIA applying for Membership must
- **(i) have existed for at least five years**;
- **(ii) dispose of committees or working groups ensuring continuous engagement with the aims of the NAIA**; and
- **(iii) dispose of an established automotive quality related competency**."
French: "(i) exister depuis au moins cinq ans, (ii) disposer de comités ou de groupes de travail garantissant un engagement continu envers les objectifs de l'ANIA, et (iii) disposer d'une compétence établie en matière de qualité automobile."
## 4. The ratio criterion — the 2:1 balance
"Furthermore, an NAIA can only become a Member if **at the time of application for Membership the ratio of OEM Members to NAIA Members (including the new NAIA Membership application) is not inferior to 2**, i.e. that **at least 2/3 of the Members must be OEM Members** at the time of Membership application, including the new NAIA Membership application."
Two features of this criterion matter:
- It is tested **only at the time of application**, not on a continuing basis; and
- **Art. 7.3(a)(i)** expressly removes it from the exclusion grounds: a Member may be excluded if it "no longer fulfils the criteria of Membership of its relevant category referred to in Article 5.1 … (**for the avoidance of doubt: the criterion set out in Article 5.1(b) last sentence shall not be taken into consideration for the purposes of loss of Membership**)". So an existing NAIA Member cannot be excluded merely because the OEM:NAIA ratio later slips below 2.
## 5. The general admission conditions (apply to NAIAs as to OEMs)
- **Art. 5.3**: "Any request for Membership will be subject to meeting the criteria for one of the Membership categories described above in this Article 5 and **committing to abide by the Articles of Association and all Internal Regulations** of the Association."
- **Art. 5.4**: "Prior to approval of Membership, **one dedicated member of the Board will assist the Member candidate** through the Membership application process … the Board may also collect views on the Member candidate from the General Assembly."
- **Art. 5.5**: the Board recommends approval or denial "by application of the criteria set out in Article 5.1"; the General Assembly votes, and that vote "will have to be taken … by applying **no other criteria than the Membership criteria set out in Article 5.1**", requiring "a **75% majority of the votes cast**". A denial must state "for which reasons they consider the Membership criteria not fulfilled." (Quorum: Art. 12.1, at least 75% of all Members with voting rights present or represented.)
- **Art. 5.7**: the decision is "**without appeal or other legal remedy** for the Member candidate, save for the legally not binding complaints procedure with the Complaints Committee set out in the Internal Regulations for Membership to be adopted by the General Assembly."
- **Art. 5.9**: "The Association shall have at least five Members at all times." **Art. 8**: "The Association shall not levy any membership fees."
- **Art. 5.8**: the initial Members are the signatories of the act of incorporation.
## 6. Continuing obligation specific to NAIA Members
**Art. 6.1(c)**: each Member shall at all times, "in the case of **NAIA Members, be representative of national interests of the automotive industry in their respective countries**" (French: "être représentatifs des intérêts nationaux de l'industrie automobile dans leurs pays respectifs"). Breach of Art. 6 is an exclusion ground under Art. 7.3(a)(ii). All the other Art. 6.1 obligations (compliance, active participation, designating a representative and alternate, competition-law compliance, unconditional acceptance of mutual recognition of certificates, good faith) apply equally.
## 7. Role of NAIAs in the governance structure
- **Art. 19.2**: "The interests of the suppliers will be specifically represented **through the NAIAs** and through the Supplier Committee (Article 18.1(c))."
- Like all Members, each NAIA has **one vote** (Art. 9.3) and may appoint a representative and alternate to each Committee except the Supplier, Complaints and Remuneration and Finance Committees (Art. 18.3).
## 8. Shorter glossary definition used in the contracts
The Distribution Partner contracts carry a trimmed definition — e.g. item 88 of ANNEX III in `finalforsignature__II.1_260717_3rd_Party_Auditor_Training_Distribution_Partner_Contract.txt` (also in `finalforsignature__II.2_260717_Distribution_Partner_Contract_for_IATF_Publications.txt`, `distributionpartnercontracts__260213_Distribution_Partner_Contract_for_the_Management_of_CBs_…_CLEAN.txt` and `02firstboardmeeting__IATF_AISBL_-_03_Minutes_of_First_Board_Meeting_-_Annex_2b_Pending_Contracts.txt`):
> "**National Automotive Industry Association / NAIA**: An organisation that represents the interests of the automotive industry in a specific country, which includes – but is not limited to – representing views, opinions and interests of suppliers of various sizes, commodities and at multiple tier levels of the automotive supply chain (and, as the case may be, non-Member OEMs)."
Note that this glossary version **omits** the one-per-country rule, the five-year/committees/quality-competency tests and the ratio rule. It is a defined term for contract purposes; the membership criteria proper are those in Art. 5.1(b).
## 9. Who the current NAIA Members are
The contract annexes record the five NAIAs: "Additional IATF members include the following five (5) National Automotive Industry Associations: **ANFIA, AIAG, FIEV, SMMT, and VDA**" (`02firstboardmeeting__IATF_AISBL_-_02_Minutes_of_First_Board_Meeting_-_Annex_2a_Final_Contracts.txt`). Note that the IP Rights Licensing Agreement names the fifth Rights Holder as "IATF France" rather than FIEV; I did not investigate that difference.
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## Points that are open or missing
- **The detailed application procedure is not in the corpus.** Art. 5.6 says the procedure "**may** be further detailed in the **Internal Regulations for Membership** that **may** be adopted by the General Assembly", and Art. 5.7 refers to the complaints procedure "set out in the Internal Regulations for Membership **to be adopted**". In my earlier searching on membership and committees I found only these forward-references; the Internal Regulations in Annex 5 to the First Board Meeting minutes regulate the Committees, not membership. So on what is in the corpus, no Internal Regulations for Membership yet exist.
- **"Only one NAIA representing (i) suppliers or (ii) suppliers and OEMs per country"** is capable of being read either as one NAIA per country full stop, or as one of each of the two descriptions per country. The French official text ("ne peut être Membre qu'une seule ANIA représentant (i) des fournisseurs ou (ii) des fournisseurs et des OEM") carries the same ambiguity. I am not resolving it.
- **"Established automotive quality related competency"** is not defined anywhere I read, and no threshold or evidential test is given.
- The Articles do not say **what happens if the 2:1 ratio makes an otherwise qualified applicant ineligible** — e.g. whether the application lapses or can be held pending until an OEM joins.
- I did not read the scanned **First General Assembly minutes** (`03firstgeneralassembly__IATF_AISBL_-_01_Minutes_of_First_General_Assembly.txt`), which have no machine-readable text layer at all; if membership admissions were dealt with there, that content is genuinely absent from the corpus.
Who owns the material in ADP
# Who owns the material in ADP
"ADP" is the **Auditor Development Platform** (Glossary item 12 in `finalforsignature__II.1_260717_3rd_Party_Auditor_Training_Distribution_Partner_Contract.txt` and the other DP contracts; also cl. 1.2.2 of `itadpageements__OVERSIGHT_OFFICES_AGREEMENT_INCLUDING_ANNEX_I_AND_ANNEX_II_CLEAN.txt`). The documents split it into two different things with **two different owners**, so the answer depends on which "material" you mean.
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## 1. The platform itself — owned by the five Oversight Offices
From the contract-status table at the front of `02firstboardmeeting__IATF_AISBL_-_03_Minutes_of_First_Board_Meeting_-_Annex_2b_Pending_Contracts.txt`:
> "**ADP Use and License Agreement** — To be signed between the **current five Oversight Offices who own intellectual property rights pertaining to ADP** and IATF AISBL for purposes of granting IATF AISBL an **exclusive license to operate and maintain ADP** itself or through third parties. • **Agreement agreed to be drafted (draft not contained in this Annex).**"
The same arrangement is defined in the Oversight Offices Agreement, `itadpageements__OVERSIGHT_OFFICES_AGREEMENT_INCLUDING_ANNEX_I_AND_ANNEX_II_CLEAN.txt`, cl. **1.2.3**:
> "**ADP Use and IP License Agreement**: Agreement concluded between OOs and IATF AISBL according to which the **OOs will grant IATF AISBL an exclusive, irrevocable license** enabling IATF AISBL to operate and maintain ADP."
So on the platform/IP layer: **the Oversight Offices are the owners; IATF AISBL is to be an exclusive licensee — and that licence agreement has not yet been drafted.** It is listed among the "Agreements to be finalised", with no draft in the corpus.
## 2. The training and assessment content inside ADP — owned by the Rights Holders
The content is a separate asset, and it sits under the IP Rights Licensing Agreement, `finalforsignature__I.1_260710_Intellectual_Property_Licensing_Agreement_Between_the_Current_Copyright_Holders_and_IATF_AISBL.txt` (Rights Holders = AIAG, ANFIA, IATF France, SMMT, VDA):
- **Clause 1.5.2** brings into the Subject Matter: "**ADP Platform Technical Training and assessment materials**" (identically worded at cl. 1.4.2 of `intellectualpropertynda__260213_IP_Agreement_between_Rights_Holders_CLEAN.txt`, and at the same clause in the executed set in `02firstboardmeeting__IATF_AISBL_-_02_Minutes_of_First_Board_Meeting_-_Annex_2a_Final_Contracts.txt`).
- **Clause 1.1**: "Rights Holders are joint owners of intellectual property rights pertaining to the Subject Matter described in this section 1."
- **Clause 2.1**: each Rights Holder grants IATF AISBL "an **exclusive, irrevocable, transferable and sub-licensable license**, unlimited in time, place and content".
- The Annex to that agreement lists, among the works, "**Auditor Development Platform (ADP) Training Content Files**" (the same list appears as ANNEX II/III to the DP contracts, e.g. `finalforsignature__II.1_260717…` and `finalforsignature__II.2_260717_Distribution_Partner_Contract_for_IATF_Publications.txt`).
So: **ADP training content and assessment materials are owned jointly by the five Rights Holders and exclusively licensed to IATF AISBL** — the same structure I described for training material generally, and subject to the same reversion on liquidation (cl. 2.6) and attribution requirements (cll. 3.2, 6.1).
## 3. Access rights are not ownership
- **Auditor Agreement** (pending, Annex 2b table): "To be signed between IATF AISBL and Auditors / Auditor Candidates for **granting Auditors / Auditor Candidates access to ADP** enabling them to register and to participate in the Auditor qualification process. • Agreement agreed to be drafted (draft not contained in this Annex)."
- **Software-as-a-Service Agreement** (Annex 2b table): between IATF AISBL and the Oversight Offices "for the purpose of **granting the Oversight Offices access to ADP**, IATF Database, IATF Customer Portal, IATF AMP and IATF CARA" — draft of 24 February 2026 in that Annex, with the availability percentage, support details, response times, liability cap and DPA Schedules 1 and 2 still open.
- **IT Service Agreement IATF AISBL / IAOB** (Annex 2b table): "for the provision of **IT Services regarding Auditor Development Platform (ADP)**" — draft of 24 February 2026, with the same list of open items.
- Distribution Partners get no rights in ADP at all; their only ADP obligation is procedural — cl. **8.9** of the 3rd Party Auditor Training DP Contract: "The Distribution Partner shall verify that the credentials of the 3rd Party Auditor will be **updated in the ADP**."
## 4. Backstop in the Articles
**Art. 7.4** of `01foundingdeed__IATF_AISBL_-_Founding_Articles_of_Association_-_EN.txt` (French at Art. 7.4 of `…_FR.txt` / the Founding Deed): if a resigning or excluded Member "owns intellectual property or systems relating to the standards owned by, or licensed to, the Association (**e.g., IATF database, ADP, AMP, IATF globe, IATF trademarks, copyright filings etc.**) such Member is obliged to transfer such intellectual property or system **at no cost** to the Association". This confirms that ADP is contemplated as being owned by Member-side entities, not by the Association.
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## What I could not establish
- **Ownership of the data/records held in ADP** (auditor credentials, CPD records, assessment results, candidate personal data) — I searched for "Customer Data", "ownership of data", "data shall remain", "remains the property" and got only one unrelated hit (an audit-confidentiality passage in Annex 2a). The IT Service Agreements and the SaaS Agreement in Annex 2b each have an "ANNEX III – Data Processing Agreement" whose **Schedules 1 and 2 are expressly still "to be finalized/completed"**, and I ran out of search steps before reading their body clauses. I therefore cannot tell you what those agreements say about data ownership, and I will not guess.
- **The ADP Use and License Agreement itself does not exist in the corpus** — the Annex 2b table says in terms that it was "agreed to be drafted" with the draft "not contained in this Annex". So the only evidence of ADP ownership is the two descriptive passages quoted in sections 1 above, not an operative grant.
- **The relationship between "the current five Oversight Offices" (who own ADP) and "the Rights Holders" (who own the ADP content)** — the corpus names the Rights Holders as AIAG, ANFIA, IATF France, SMMT and VDA, and separately refers to five Oversight Offices, but I did not find a document identifying the five Oversight Offices by name, and I am not going to assume they are the same five entities.
- The executed **Oversight Offices Agreement PDF of 26 February 2026** (`06oversightofficesagreement__…`) is a scanned image with no machine-readable text; it is evidence of execution only. The readable text I quoted is the clean version in the `itadpageements` folder.