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removal of OEMs from General Assembly

james.bruin@iaob.org · 2026-10-21 03:19 AM EDT

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User 2026-10-21 03:20 AM EDT
removal of OEMs from General Assembly
Assistant 2026-10-21 03:20 AM EDT
# Removal of an OEM Member from the General Assembly The governing text is **Article 7 ("Loss of Member Status") of the IATF AISBL Founding Articles of Association**, read with Articles 5.2, 10.1(c), 12 and 17.2(g). I quote from `01foundingdeed__IATF_AISBL_-_Founding_Articles_of_Association_-_EN.txt`. Note the caveat in Article 25 of that same file: *"The Articles of Association are drafted in French and English, but only the French version represents the official text"* — the French text is in `01foundingdeed__IATF_AISBL_-_Founding_Articles_of_Association_-_FR.txt` and in the Founding Deed itself. An OEM is a Member (Article 5.1(a)), and under Article 9.1 "The General Assembly is formed by the Members of the Association" — so removal from the General Assembly means loss of Member status. ## 1. The two routes out: Article 7.1 > "**7.1** The status of Member is lost by:" The list that should follow 7.1 does not appear as a list in the text; what follows are the two headed sub-articles **7.2 Resignation** and **7.3 Exclusion**. (Article 5.2 provides a further, separate route by which an OEM ceases to be a Member — see section 4 below.) ## 2. Resignation (Article 7.2) > "Any Member is free to terminate its Membership by resigning from the Association. Any resignation must be notified to the President of the Board by registered letter, with at least six months' notice." ## 3. Exclusion (Article 7.3) **Grounds — 7.3(a).** A Member may be excluded "by decision of General Assembly" if it: - "(i) no longer fulfils the criteria of Membership of its relevant category referred to in Article 5.1 ... (for the avoidance of doubt: the criterion set out in Article 5.1(b) last sentence shall not be taken into consideration for the purposes of loss of Membership)"; - "(ii) is in breach of its Membership obligations under Article 6"; - "(iii) jeopardizes the interests of the Association"; - "(iv) is involved in a procedure of dissolution, liquidation, bankruptcy or judicial reorganization or similar procedures in any jurisdiction (unless such procedure exclusively concerns a subsidiary entity of the respective Member)"; or - "(v) has set any other serious cause". **Non-attendance — 7.3(b).** This is the provision aimed squarely at absence from the General Assembly: > "If a Member has failed to directly participate through its designated representative or alternate in the General Assembly in 12 consecutive months and has not participated via delegation to another Member as per Article 9.2 either, such Member's voting right in the General Assembly will be (automatically and without further notice) suspended and will only be reinstated (automatically and without further notice) once such Member has participated in three successive meetings of the General Assembly. Upon suspension of the voting right, the Board shall address a registered warning letter to the relevant Member announcing that Membership may be terminated by exclusion if such Member does not resume its participation in the General Assembly within six months. The fact of not resuming participation in the General Assembly within the said deadline will be considered to be a serious cause within the meaning of (a)(v) above." **Who initiates — 7.3(c).** "The exclusion procedure may be initiated upon proposal of the General Assembly or by the Board." Article 17.2(g) gives the Board power to "propose the exclusion of Members and execute any exclusion voted by the General Assembly"; Article 10.1(c) reserves "exclusion of Members" to the General Assembly. **Procedure and majority — 7.3(d).** > "Before the General Assembly votes on the exclusion of a Member, the Board will inform the Member concerned, by registered letter, of the relevant facts, at least sixty (60) days prior to the proposed date of exclusion, except for cases of (b) above. The Member concerned shall be allowed to definitively remedy within this period the consequences of the violation(s) having led to the proposal for exclusion (if capable of remediation). The General Assembly may decide to exclude a Member if the Member concerned is invited to the meeting and has been given the opportunity to defend its position during the meeting of the General Assembly and before the vote on the exclusion. **Exclusion will require a vote of 75% of the Members present, and Article 12.4 shall not apply; the Member to be excluded shall not be entitled to vote.**" Two points on the voting mechanics: the 75% is expressed as a percentage of **Members present** (not of votes cast), and the disapplication of Article 12.4 means abstentions **are** counted in the denominator (12.4 otherwise provides that "no account shall be taken of the vote of the Members who abstain from voting"). The general quorum in Article 12.1 (75% of all Members with voting rights present or represented) is not expressly disapplied. Article 11.5 also applies: "No vote can take place on an item which is not on the agenda." **Finality and interim suspension — 7.3(d), final sentences.** > "The decisions of the Board and of the General Assembly regarding the exclusion of a Member shall be motivated and are final, binding and without appeal other than the complaints procedure with the Complaints Committee, whose decision will be without appeal or other legal remedy. **All rights of the Member concerned are suspended from the time of receipt of the letter from the Board (cf. (b) and (d) sentence 1) to the Member until the vote of the General Assembly on the exclusion.**" ## 4. OEM-specific route: corporate restructuring (Article 5.2) This operates independently of Article 7 and does not require an exclusion vote: - **Merger (5.2(a)):** "If a merger or other combination of businesses occurs that involves two or more OEM Members, then only the continuing entity will remain a Member... The discontinued Membership will terminate on 31 December of the year following effectiveness of the merger..., unless the General Assembly fixes a longer term upon application of the Member whose Membership is terminated." - **Split/spin-off (5.2(b)):** resulting OEM entities "will cease to be Members but may request for Membership, which request the Board must unconditionally accept if the application is made within one year". ## 5. Consequences (Article 7.4) Applicable to "[a]ny resigning or excluded Member": continued commitments and financial charges "until the end of the financial year in which the end of its Membership becomes effective"; no indemnification or claim on assets; immediate cessation of holding itself out as a Member; deletion/return of documents; and under 7.4(b), obligation to "transfer such intellectual property or system at no cost to the Association without undue delay" where it owns IP or systems relating to the Association's standards (IATF database, ADP, AMP, IATF globe, IATF trademarks, copyright filings). Under 7.4(c) it "can be reconsidered as a candidate for Membership". ## Caveats - **Article 7.1 is incomplete on its face** in the text as it stands — the enumeration after "The status of Member is lost by:" is absent. Whether that is an OCR artefact or the document's actual state, I cannot tell from this corpus; the French official version should be checked against the notarial original. I am flagging it rather than resolving it. - The Complaints Committee route (Articles 7.3(d), 18.1(g)) is referenced but its procedure is said to sit in Internal Regulations. I searched for exclusion/membership provisions in the Internal Regulations (Annex 5 to the First Board Meeting minutes) and found no matches; note also that one page of that file is a scan with no machine-readable text. **An Internal Regulation for Membership (contemplated by Articles 5.6 and 5.7) does not appear in the corpus** — so the detailed complaints and application procedure is not something I can report on. - I did not find any counsel's comment ([cN] anchor) attached to Articles 5 or 7, so there is no drafting-rationale note on these clauses in the corpus. There is only one version of these Articles here, and I cannot tell you how the exclusion provisions read in any earlier draft. This is a summary of the documents, not legal advice.
User 2026-10-21 03:26 AM EDT
Criteria to be an OEM member
Assistant 2026-10-21 03:26 AM EDT
# Criteria to Qualify as an OEM Member of IATF AISBL The governing provision is **Article 5.1(a)** of the IATF AISBL Articles of Association. I quote the English text from `01foundingdeed__IATF_AISBL_-_Founding_Articles_of_Association_-_EN.txt`, with the official French from `01foundingdeed__IATF_AISBL_-_Founding_Articles_of_Association_-_FR.txt` (Article 25: *"only the French version represents the official text of the Articles of Association"*). ## 1. The definition itself — Article 5.1(a) > "**5.1** There are two categories of Members within the Association: > **(a)** Original Equipment Automotive Manufacturers (**"OEM"**), being defined as a parent organization that designs and assembles automobiles and/or on-highway trucks, excluding holding companies unless the holding company itself is an OEM. Subsidiaries of OEMs owned by a parent organization are eligible for Membership instead of the parent organisation with written approval from the parent organization, i.e. there can only be one Member per OEM parent organization group." The French official text: > "**(a)** les fabricants d'équipement d'origine (**"OEM"**), définis comme une organisation mère qui conçoit et assemble des automobiles et/ou des camions routiers, à l'exclusion des sociétés holding, sauf si la société holding est elle-même un OEM. Les filiales d'OEM détenues par une organisation mère peuvent devenir Membres à la place de l'organisation mère avec l'accord écrit de cette dernière, c'est-à-dire qu'il ne peut y avoir qu'un seul membre par groupe d'organisation mère OEM." Broken into elements, an OEM must be: | # | Criterion | Source | |---|---|---| | 1 | A **parent organization** ("organisation mère") | 5.1(a) sentence 1 | | 2 | That **designs** the relevant products | 5.1(a) sentence 1 | | 3 | **And assembles** them (the conjunction is "and", not "or") | 5.1(a) sentence 1 | | 4 | The products being **automobiles and/or on-highway trucks** | 5.1(a) sentence 1 | | 5 | **Not a holding company** — "excluding holding companies unless the holding company itself is an OEM" | 5.1(a) sentence 1 | Note that criteria 2–4 are cumulative as to design *and* assembly, but disjunctive as to product type (automobiles and/or on-highway trucks). ## 2. The one-member-per-group rule and the subsidiary substitution A **subsidiary** may take the Membership instead of the parent, but only "**with written approval from the parent organization**". The consequence, stated twice in Article 5 for emphasis, is that "**there can only be one Member per OEM parent organization group**" — repeated as a standalone sentence at the end of Article 5.2(b). Unlike the NAIA category, there is **no minimum age, no committee/working-group requirement, no demonstrated "automotive quality related competency" requirement, and no ratio test** applying to OEMs. Those four conditions appear only in Article 5.1(b) and apply to NAIAs. The ratio test in 5.1(b) does constrain the *overall* composition — "at least 2/3 of the Members must be OEM Members at the time of Membership application" — but it is a gate on NAIA admissions, not on OEM admissions. ## 3. Additional conditions applicable to any applicant, including an OEM **Article 5.3** — substantive condition: > "Any request for Membership will be subject to meeting the criteria for one of the Membership categories described above in this Article 5 **and committing to abide by the Articles of Association and all Internal Regulations of the Association**." That commitment carries with it the Article 6.1 obligations, notably 6.1(e) (competition law, trade secret protection, the compliance guidelines) and 6.1(f) ("unconditionally accept the mutual recognition of certificates issued under the standards licensed to the Association"). Article 6.1(c) — being representative of national interests — applies only "in the case of NAIA Members". **Article 5.4** — sponsored application process: > "Prior to approval of Membership, one dedicated member of the Board will assist the Member candidate through the Membership application process, which task ceases upon approval of Membership; the Board may also collect views on the Member candidate from the General Assembly. **This process shall not apply to OEMs requesting Membership after a split, spin-off or similar measure under Article 5.2(b).**" **Article 5.5** — decision and majority. The Board recommends "by application of the criteria set out in Article 5.1"; the General Assembly votes, and the vote "will have to be taken by the General Assembly by applying **no other criteria than the Membership criteria set out in Article 5.1**", requiring "a **75% majority of the votes cast**". A refusal must be reasoned: "the General Assembly, will have to state for which reasons they consider the Membership criteria not fulfilled." **Article 5.7** — no appeal, save the "legally not binding complaints procedure with the Complaints Committee set out in the Internal Regulations for Membership". **Article 5.8** — the founding OEMs did not go through this: "The initial Members of the Association are signatories of the act of incorporation containing these present Articles of Association." ## 4. Automatic-admission route after a split or spin-off — Article 5.2(b) > "If an OEM Member is split or if a spin-off or a similar corporate measure occurs, then all entities that result from such legal operation and that are OEMs will cease to be Members but may request for Membership, **which request the Board must unconditionally accept if the application is made within one year** starting on the effective date of the split or spin-off or similar measure. Each of the applying OEMs will have full voting rights." This is the one case where qualification is not discretionary: the entity must still *be* an OEM within the 5.1(a) definition, but if it is, and applies within a year, the Board has no discretion and no General Assembly vote under 5.5 is contemplated. The one-member-per-parent-group rule still applies. ## 5. Continuing relevance of the criteria Under **Article 7.3(a)(i)**, a Member that "no longer fulfils the criteria of Membership of its relevant category referred to in Article 5.1" may be excluded. The carve-out — "the criterion set out in Article 5.1(b) last sentence shall not be taken into consideration for the purposes of loss of Membership" — protects NAIAs against the 2:1 ratio turning into a ground for exclusion; it does not carve out anything from 5.1(a). So the OEM criteria must be satisfied on a continuing basis, not just at admission. ## Caveats and limits of what I found - **"On-highway trucks" is not defined** anywhere I read in Article 5, nor are "designs", "assembles" or "holding company". Whether, for example, a bus, off-highway or agricultural vehicle manufacturer qualifies is not resolved by the text. I am flagging that rather than resolving it. - The **Internal Regulations for Membership** contemplated by Articles 5.6 and 5.7 — which would contain the detailed application procedure and the Complaints Committee process — **do not appear in this corpus**. I searched for membership/OEM criteria provisions and found nothing responsive in the Internal Regulations annexed to the First Board Meeting minutes. - **No counsel's comment ([cN] anchor) is attached to Article 5** in either language version, so there is no drafting-rationale note on the OEM definition in the corpus. - There is one version of these Articles here, coordinated by Notary Tim Carnewal (ref. D. 2254894 / R. 2026-149868, 26-02-2026). I cannot tell you how the OEM definition read in any earlier draft — that evidence is not in the corpus. Note also that 81 of 118 pages of the Founding Deed file are scanned images without a text layer; my quotations come from the separate Articles of Association files and the readable portion of the Deed. This is a summary of the documents, not legal advice.
User 2026-10-21 03:34 AM EDT
are OEMs required to require IATF certification of their suppliers?
Assistant 2026-10-21 03:34 AM EDT
# Are OEM Members Required to Require IATF Certification of Their Suppliers? **No — and the Articles say so expressly.** The governing provision is **Article 6.3 of the IATF AISBL Articles of Association**, which does the opposite of imposing such a requirement: it protects Members' freedom *not* to insist on certification. ## The governing text — Article 6.3 From `01foundingdeed__IATF_AISBL_-_Founding_Articles_of_Association_-_EN.txt`: > "**6.3** Notwithstanding the obligations set out in Article 6.1., Members shall not be restricted from contracting with any supplier that has not been certified in accordance with the standards licensed to the Association. They shall further be free to request suppliers to fulfil additional requirements going beyond those covered by the standards licensed to the Association." The official French text, from `01foundingdeed__IATF_AISBL_-_Founding_Articles_of_Association_-_FR.txt` (Article 25: "only the French version represents the official text"), and reproduced identically in `01foundingdeed__IATF_AISBL_-_Founding_Deed.txt`: > "**6.3** Nonobstant les obligations énoncées à l'article 6.1, les Membres ne seront pas empêchés de passer un contrat avec un fournisseur qui n'a pas été certifié conformément aux normes concédées sous licence à l'Association. Ils seront en outre libres de demander aux fournisseurs de satisfaire à des exigences supplémentaires allant au-delà de celles couvertes par les normes concédées sous licence à l'Association." Three things follow from the drafting: 1. **It is a freedom, not an obligation.** The clause is cast as a negative guarantee ("shall not be restricted" / "ne seront pas empêchés"). Nothing in it, and nothing I found elsewhere, obliges a Member to require certification of anyone. 2. **The "Notwithstanding" opener is a carve-out from Article 6.1.** It expressly overrides the general membership obligations — including 6.1(a) (comply with the Articles, Internal Regulations and all decisions taken under them) and 6.1(b) (actively support and promote the aims of the Association). So an OEM cannot be told, by Internal Regulation or General Assembly decision, that supporting the Association's aims entails mandating certification in its supply chain. 3. **Sourcing freedom runs in both directions.** The second sentence confirms Members may go *beyond* the IATF standards in what they ask of suppliers; the first confirms they may contract with suppliers who meet *none* of them. ## The one certification-related obligation that does exist — Article 6.1(f) The only certification obligation on Members is about *recognising* certificates, not *requiring* them: > "**6.1** Each Member shall, at all times: ... **(f)** unconditionally accept the mutual recognition of certificates issued under the standards licensed to the Association, regardless of the issuing IATF recognized Certification Body" That is an anti-discrimination rule between IATF-recognised Certification Bodies — a Member may not refuse a certificate because of which recognised CB issued it. It says nothing about whether a supplier must hold a certificate at all. Note too the qualifier at the end of Article 6.1: "Members are not required to comply with IATF decisions where complying with such decisions would be unlawful for the respective Member." ## Why the clause reads this way I did not find a counsel's comment ([cN] anchor) attached to Article 6.3, so I cannot point you to a drafting-rationale note in the corpus. What I can say is that Article 6.3 sits immediately alongside the competition-law machinery: Article 6.1(e) requires Members to "comply with applicable rules under competition law and trade secret protection; this shall include the compliance guidelines established by the General Assembly", and Articles 10.1(k) and 17.2(l) give the General Assembly and Board the power to adopt and propose "compliance guidelines". Article 6.3 reads as a purchasing-independence safeguard of the kind competition counsel build into standard-setting bodies whose members are purchasers. That is my reading of the structure, not something the documents state. ## Where the suppliers' interests *are* addressed Not through any purchasing mandate, but through representation: - **Article 18.1(c)** — a standing "Supplier Committee, composed of representatives of suppliers to be appointed as specified in the Internal Regulations", which under Article 18.4(c) elects its own chair and vice-chair from among its own members (unlike other Committees, which are chaired by a Board member). - **Article 19.2** — "The interests of the suppliers will be specifically represented through the NAIAs and through the Supplier Committee (Article 18.1(c))." - **Article 5.1(b)** — NAIAs are defined by reference to "representing views, opinions and interests of suppliers of various sizes, commodities and at multiple tier levels of the automotive supply chain". ## Caveats and the limits of my search - I searched the corpus for "supplier", for certification-requirement language, for "compliance guidelines", for the French "fournisseur", and for mandating language ("not be restricted", "mandate", "oblige … suppliers", "impose … certification"). **No provision anywhere requiring a Member or OEM to require IATF certification of its suppliers appears in the corpus.** The only on-point provision is Article 6.3, which points the other way. - The hits in the certification-scheme documents (the Rules for achieving and maintaining IATF recognition, and IATF 16949 itself, in `02firstboardmeeting__IATF_AISBL_-_02_Minutes_of_First_Board_Meeting_-_Annex_2a_Final_Contracts.txt`) impose supplier-related duties on **certified organisations** (e.g. clause 8.4.1.2 "Supplier selection process", 8.4.2.3 "Supplier quality management system development", 8.4.2.4 "Supplier monitoring"). Those bind a company *because it holds an IATF 16949 certificate*, not because it is an OEM Member of the association. They are a different legal relationship, and I have not read those clauses in full. - There is a related but distinct concept — "IATF OEM customer-specific requirements", referred to in the Rules (e.g. at section 3.1: "customer dissatisfaction scenarios that require certification body notification as described in IATF OEM customer-specific requirements"). That machinery assumes OEMs *may* set their own customer-specific requirements; it does not oblige them to require certification, and I did not read the CSR documents themselves — **I did not locate a set of IATF OEM customer-specific requirements as a standalone document in this corpus.** - The **compliance guidelines** in `complianceguidelines__17_02_26_2.3_Guidelines_Set_3_Draft_7__Clean.txt` and `02firstboardmeeting__IATF_AISBL_-_04_Minutes_of_First_Board_Meeting_-_Annex_4_Competition_Law_Guidelines.txt` govern the Association's agreements with Oversight Offices, PDPs, 3PDPs and 1&2PDPs. My searches of them returned nothing addressed to OEM Members' own purchasing conduct. Note that file is stamped "Draft 7" of 17 February 2026. - There is one version of these Articles in the corpus (coordinated by Notary Tim Carnewal, ref. D. 2254894 / R. 2026-149868, 26-02-2026). I cannot tell you how Article 6.3 read in any earlier draft — that evidence is not here. This is a summary of the documents, not legal advice. Whether Article 6.3 would also prevent an OEM from being *criticised* within the Association for sourcing from uncertified suppliers, as opposed to being formally obliged not to, is not something the text resolves, and I am flagging that rather than answering it.